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Do chiefly systems discourage schooling? 
 
Abstract 
An indigenous chiefly system can shape a country’s economic growth and inequality 
through institutional development in its colonial history. This paper addresses this thesis 
by using original household survey data in rural Fiji, which contain unique information 
about traditional chiefly status, and Fijian coups as a natural experiment. It demonstrates 
that chiefly labor networks in non-farm occupations that originated from the British 
colonial policy persistently affected Fijians’ schooling. Chiefly networks were effective 
for employment among male Fijians before and after 1970 independence, until the first 
coup occurred in 1987; then, their schooling strongly adjusted to structural changes in 
labor market. Those outside the chiefly network – the majority of Fijians – have always 
been discouraged from making education investments, because of low returns in the 
network-driven labor market. Without being directly constrained by this chiefly 
institution, Indians and Female Fijians outperformed male Fijians in higher education.  
Keywords: Chiefly system; Colonial policy; Labor network; Schooling; Fiji. 
JEL classification: O15; O17. 
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1.  Introduction 
Recent literature has shown that historical circumstances can persistently affect 
economic performance through their effect on institutional development (Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). Although various 
institutions, such as property rights, law, power, and class, have received much attention 
(e.g., Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Goldstein and Udry, 2009; Huillery, 2009; La Porta et al., 
1998; Pandey, 2010), the mechanisms underlying such persistence are less understood 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008 develop a theory; see also Nunn, 2007). Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2006) shed light on gender-cum-caste labor networks as one such 
mechanism in 1990s’ Bombay: It made schooling responses to increased returns to 
nontraditional white-collar occupation distinct in the gender sphere – girls’ enrollments in 
English schools increased more than boys’. Using original household survey data in rural 
Fiji, this paper examines how the indigenous chiefly system interacted with British 
colonial policy to persistently affect Fijians’ schooling.  
Fiji’s ethnic division is well known: Fijians have significantly lagged behind 
Indians in commerce, the professions, and higher education since the 1950s (e.g., Norton, 
1977; Tavola, 1992; White, 2001).
1
                                                 
1 As is common in Fiji, in this paper, Fijians means native Fijians and Indians means 
Indo-Fijians. 
 Despite affirmative-education policies for Fijians 
following independence in 1970, the ethnic gap in secondary and tertiary education has 
never narrowed. Indians’ economic and social mobility led to the country’s ethnic tension 
and, in particular, four coups since the late 1980s. At the same time, after independence, 
female Fijians caught up with and then surpassed male Fijians in secondary education.    3 
This paper sheds new light on Fijian labor networks as a potential mechanism that 
drove the country’s distinct education paths. The British colonial government established 
native administration based on the indigenous chiefly system; as a result, “the native (or, 
as it was known later, Fijian) administration became an important additional source of 
power and patronage for the chiefs, and employment for many commoners” (Ghai, 1987, 
p10). That is, colonialism legitimatized historical inequalities in the hierarchical chiefly 
system of Fijian society. Many politicians and highly ranked government officials have 
come from chiefly families (for example, the current grand chief in my study area is a 
Cabinet Minister). I argue that chiefly labor network for commoners’ employment in the 
native administration sustained and expanded to broad labor networks in non-farm 
occupations – from urban to rural – in the country, thereby persistently affecting their 
schooling after independence. Those outside chiefly networks – the majority of Fijians – 
have been discouraged from making education investments over time, because of low 
returns in the network-driven labor market. The paper shows evidence for the influence 
of chiefly labor networks on secondary schooling in rural areas, suggesting its broad 
discouraging effects on higher education in the country.      
Chiefly labor networks are distinct from low-caste labor networks (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig, 2006). In Bombay, labor networks in traditional occupations with low 
returns that do not require higher education constrain schooling among those in the 
network, because of the sanction imposed on those who exit the network. In Fiji, labor 
networks in formal occupations with high returns that require higher education constrain 
schooling among those outside the network. Though both types of networks have the 
potential to involve dynamic inefficiency, the latter may be more relevant in poor   4 
countries than the former. In both cases, as labor networks historically exist among males, 
female schooling has been less constrained. In Fiji, this contrast extends to the ethnic 
sphere: Although Indian labor networks could also play a major role, they were not 
formed according to hereditary chiefly status.      
In the literature, a labor network is captured by a network link (e.g., whether an 
individual has a connection with the job through kinship) or size (e.g., the number of 
workers in the same group, such as caste) (e.g., Munshi, 2003; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 
2006). Such information, which my data lack, is not sufficient to capture a chiefly 
network. Crucial information about the chiefly status of the individual with whom 
network is linked or of the group based on which network is formed is needed. These two 
types of networks overlap with each other when the former individual-based network is 
formed within the group, and in Fiji, the latter group-based network can be formed by 
either a village or clan (a kin group within the village, as defined below). Takasaki (2011) 
finds that in Fijians’ household private transfers, both within- and across-village networks 
are important and mainly formed among households that belong to the same clan. My 
survey stratified Fijian villages by chiefly-village status (defined below) and households 
in each village by clan. Thus, the data contain rich variations in chiefly-group status; in 
standard household surveys, by contrast, traditional elite status is often unobservable to 
researchers, and even if it is observable, there are too few elite groups to make a 
statistical analysis possible.  
Lack of network data precludes me from directly identifying chiefly labor 
networks’ positive influences on schooling. My empirical strategy is to see whether 
schooling responses to chiefly-group status correspond to employment responses over   5 
time, by using the coups as a natural experiment. First, I examine whether a group-based 
labor network is formed according to chiefly-group status, if such a network exists. The 
chiefly-village network was effective for employment among male Fijians before and 
after 1970 independence, until the first coup occurred in 1987; with village factors, 
including network, fully controlled for, chiefly-clan network was always ineffective. 
Next, I show that male Fijians’ schooling strongly adjusted to the structural change in the 
labor market: After the network effect on employment vanished, those in the network 
augmented education investment for better employment prospects. This pattern is found 
in chiefly villages, but not in clans, for secondary-school completion (which is a passport 
to employment), but not secondary enrollment. This strong correspondence of 
employment and schooling is shown to be qualitatively robust.      
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a description of 
Fijian education history. Section 3 describes the Fijian chiefly system and the data. 
Section 4 provides descriptive statistics on income, employment, and schooling. Section 
5 develops empirical models to test the hypotheses discussed above. Section 6 reports 
estimation results, the robustness of which is discussed in Section 7. The last section 
concludes. 
2.  Fijian education history 
2.1. Colonialism – 1874-1970 
In 1874, Fiji became a British colony, and a native administration was established 
for the indigenous chiefly system. Fiji’s formal education had begun in Methodist 
mission schools (in 1835), and the British colonial policy was in principle against giving 
too much education to natives. Commoners’ education was limited to primary schooling   6 
with a practical focus – vocational, agricultural, and technical for boys and hygiene and 
crafts for girls; in contrast, chiefs were educated to secondary and tertiary levels overseas. 
This discriminatory policy was strongly seconded by administrative chiefs: “Fijians of 
chiefly descent coveted a selective formal education as an avenue of privilege, a vehicle 
to differentiate themselves from commoners, and a means to consolidate their status” 
(White, 2001, p260).
2
Between 1879 and 1916, the colonial government brought over 60,000 indentured 
laborers from India for sugar plantation.
  
3
                                                 
2 The most influential chief in the colonial era, Oxford-educated Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, 
consistently called for “education with a local bias” for Fijians (Scarr, 1982): “What is 
required is a scheme of education that will fit the Fijian child to become a good citizen of 
his own country which needs above all…farmers, mechanics, boat-builders, men skilled 
in indigenous handicrafts, girls with a practical knowledge of housecraft: home-cleaning, 
cooking, washing, sewing, nursing.”  
 Under the paternalistic colonial policy 
protecting Fijians, Indians experienced much lower economic and social conditions; in 
particular, there existed a large gap in primary education between the two races. In 1916, 
to expand schools with limited supervision and cost, the colonial government launched 
the grant-in-aid system – providing government financial support to primary schools that 
met prescribed standards (by 1931, most mission schools were handed over to local 
committees). Indians, who were virtually prevented from owning land and thus strove for 
education to attain mobility, took advantage of this policy; in contrast, Fijians with land 
and ascribed social status were less likely to seek social mobility through education, and 
3 In 1921 Fijians and Indians accounted for 54% and 39%, respectively, of the total 
population (Gillion, 1977). In 1920s Fijians suffered heavy losses of life from introduced 
diseases, and in the mid-1940s Indians slightly outnumbered Fijians in the population. 
The population share was reversed after the 1987 coups, because of Indians’ out-
migration.     7 
their responses were much weaker (Tavola, 1992). As a result, Indian primary schools 
quickly expanded, closing the ethnic gap in primary education.  
The two races followed distinctly different paths of secondary education. On one 
hand, Fijians did not demand academic education, because they placed great faith in their 
chiefs in the indigenous chiefly system and the native administration to represent their 
interests; on the other hand, Indians sought after academic secondary education for 
everyone (Tavola, 1992). In 1937, the colonial government accepted providing funds for 
the establishment of secondary schools only for Indians. Restrictions on rural Fijians’ 
migration to urban areas (from 1920s to mid-1960s) – which the colonial administration 
and administrative chiefs considered to be a social disruption – also restricted their access 
to secondary schools; such restrictions were not imposed on Indians (White, 2001).
4 
Although there was almost no ethnic disparity in secondary-school rolls in the mid-1940s, 
Indians’ rolls became double those of Fijians in 1955; after the grant-in-aid system was 
extended to secondary schools in 1956, the gap widened even more. In the 1960s, 
secondary-school enrollments quickly increased among both races, with a persistent 
ethnic gap.
5
During the late-colonial period, government intervention in education increased, 
and in 1947 the Ten Year Plan, the first comprehensive plan for education, was 
developed. From the mid-1940s, selected commoners started to be sent away for tertiary 
  
                                                 
4 Indians’ strengthened political presence underlay their progress: Beginning in 1929 the 
Legislative Council, the body of nominees that advised the governor, consisted of six 
elected European seats, six elected Indians, and six nominated Fijians. In the mid-1940s, 
the Legislative Council tightened migration restrictions on Fijians.  
5 Bertocchi and Spagat (2004) theoretically study how the evolution of an education 
system founded on a hierarchical differentiation between vocational and general interacts 
with economic growth and inequality. Fiji is a unique example where such educational 
differentiation tightly matched ethnicity.    8 
education overseas, and by the early 1960s, some commoners enjoyed a successful 
economic position and its accompanying status. The chiefs’ influence remained powerful, 
however: “The high chiefs formed a dominant status group that guided the social and 
political values of upwardly mobile commoners” (Norton, 1977). 
2.2. Post-independence – 1970-1987 
At independence in 1970, chiefly governance was maintained and Fijians’ 
political and economic status was ensured.
6
In 1968 the University of the South Pacific was established with a main goal of 
training secondary teachers; in the 1980s Fiji’s education policy shifted its focus from 
quantity expansion to quality improvement and from teacher training to curriculum 
revision (teaching opportunities were saturated by 1987) (Tavola, 1992). 
 By then, education had proved to be a 
passport for Indians to enter commerce and the professions. Realizing the instrumental 
value of education for economic and social mobility, Fijians were concerned about their 
inferior position (Tavola, 1992). Although the Fijian government adopted various 
affirmative policies (e.g., school construction, scholarships) and secondary schooling 
continued to improve among both races, the ethnic gap in secondary (and tertiary) 
education and economic status never narrowed. Within both races, girls’ secondary-
school enrollments were almost nonexistent in the mid-1940s and much lower than boys’ 
before 1970 independence; then, girls’ enrollments quickly increased and surpassed boys’ 
by 1981. The gender gap has persisted since that time. 
2.3. Coups – 1987-2006 
                                                 
6 Under the 1970 Fijian constitution, parliament seats are allocated among ethnic groups 
(22 Fijians, 22 Indians, and 8 of other races), a large proportion of Senate members are 
nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs, and the land and rights of Fijians are protected.    9 
The 1987 elections resulted in a coalition backed largely by Indians and since 
then, Fiji’s democratic rule has been interrupted by four coups – two in 1987, one in 2000, 
and another in 2006 – aiming essentially to maintain Fijians’ political dominance over 
Indians. Major economic reforms for outward-looking liberalization were implemented 
mainly after the 1987 coups (Elek et al., 1993). It is probable that associated structural 
changes occurred in the labor market (there is no systematic study of the Fijian labor 
market).    
3.  Fijian chiefly system and data 
3.1. Chiefly system 
Chiefdom is "an autonomous political unit comprising a number of villages or 
communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief" (Cameiro, 1981, p45). 
Fijian chiefdom, vanua, consists of three hierarchical subunits, yavusa-mataqali-tokatoka, 
as illustrated in Figure 1 (Ravuvu, 1983). Each unit is a subset of its higher-order unit 
(e.g., yavusa 1 consists of mataqali 1 and 2). Roughly matching an old district (tikina) in 
the administrative unit, vanua ranges over several villages (koro). A village consists of 
one or a few yavusa, which includes several lower-order units, mataqali, and then 
tokatoka. The chiefly system is of central importance not only for rural Fijians’ local 
governance and ritual, but also for their livelihoods (Turner, 1992); in particular, land is 
communally owned by mataqali (about 83% of the country’s total land is communal and 
cannot be sold by law), and customary rights for coastal fishing are held by vanua or 
several yavusa.  
Each vanua has a paramount chief, and some yavusa and mataqali, but not 
tokatoka, have sub-chiefs. There are also traditional leaders other than chiefs/sub-chiefs,   10 
and village chiefs can be served by chiefs, sub-chiefs, or non-chief leaders. Accordingly, 
Fijian villages are categorized as either a chiefly village with a vanua chief, or other 
(village 1 vs. 2), and mataqali (henceforth called clan) is either a chiefly clan to which the 
vanua chief in the chiefly village belongs, or other (mataqali 1 vs. 2).
7
3.2. Data 
 In principle, there 
is one chiefly village in each vanua (or tikina), and there is one chiefly clan in each 
chiefly village. The chiefly status normally is ascribed and inherited through the male 
line; chiefly-village status and chiefly-clan status are fixed across generations.  
In July-September 2005, I conducted a household survey in Cakaudrove Province, 
which is located mainly on Vanua Levu Island and Taveuni Island, the second- and third-
largest islands in the country, which significantly lag behind the largest island, Viti Levu, 
where the state capital, two international airports, and most tourism businesses are 
situated. Cakaudrove is home to many leading politicians and has been one of Fiji’s most 
influential provinces.  
The province has 134 Fijian villages in 16 districts (tikina). In each district, 
villages were stratified by chiefly-village status; 13 chiefly villages were sampled and 
another 30 villages with distinct environmental and economic conditions were 
intentionally chosen.
8
                                                 
7 I focus on the chiefly status of mataqali. Many villages have only one yavusa (i.e., 
yavusa defines the village) and the tokatoka to which the vanua chief belongs is too 
uncommon for statistical analysis, as shown below.  
 In each village, households were stratified by tokatoka (the 
8 Among 16 districts, 2 are headed by the same vanua chief and another 2 are headed by 
the other same vanua chief; thus, there are 14 chiefly villages. One chiefly village was 
not sampled because of a political concern. In each of three districts where there are more 
than one vanua, only one village with a main vauna chief is treated as a chiefly village; 
that is, chiefly-village status is defined at the tikina level, not at the vanua level; using   11 
smallest subunit) and a combination of individual leadership status discussed above and 
major asset holdings (e.g., shops) (all tokatoka are sampled); in each stratum, households 
were randomly sampled (50% of the population in each stratum, on average). As such, 
chiefly villages and households with chiefs/sub-chiefs/non-chief leaders are oversampled. 
Overall, the survey covered 906 households, collecting information about demographics, 
education, assets, production, income, shocks, and transfers.  
The 43 villages in the sample cover 20 vanua, 52 yavusa, 145 mataqali, and 238 
tokatoka in total, and 13 yavusa, 12 mataqali, and 12 tokatoka have vanua chiefs;
9
The survey did not cover individuals who migrated to urban areas, and in the 
sample, tertiary education was very uncommon even among young adults, indicating 
their potentially significant urban migration in search of tertiary education, further 
training, and better employment. The analysis in the remaining sections focuses on 
employment and secondary education among those who stayed in the rural study area.  
 34% 
of households reside in chiefly villages and 14% belong to chiefly clans. Almost all 
adults (age 20 or above) are commoners. There are 23 chiefs/sub-chiefs (less than 1%), 
most of whom are sub-chiefs; many vanua chiefs reside in cities.  
4.  Income, employment, and education 
4.1. Income and employment 
On average, households in the sample earned an annual income of F$2,281 per 
capita in 2005 (1 Fiji dollar = US$.60) (see Table 1). Farming and fishing, respectively, 
                                                                                                                                                 
chiefly-village status defined at the vanua level (there are 15 such chiefly villages) does 
not alter the regression results presented below.   
9 In one chiefly village, none of the chiefly mataqali (and tokatoka) resides in the village.   12 
accounted for 62% and 11% of total earned income;
10
Households are divided into three cohorts by the age of household head – cohort 1 
(age 50 or above), 2 (35-49), and 3 (20-34). With no delay or repetition in primary 
schooling, household heads in cohort 1 began secondary schooling, if any, during the 
late-colonial period (when secondary-school enrollments started to increase 
significantly); those in cohort 2 did so between 1970 independence and the 1987 coups 
(when major construction of secondary schools occurred in rural areas); and those in 
cohort 3 did so mostly between the 1987 and 2000 coups (when education policy focused 
on quality improvement). Permanent employment was more common and important in 
the livelihoods of the young cohort than for those of the old (8% of income share in 
cohort 1 vs. 22% in cohort 3).  
 16% of households had permanent 
non-farm employment, accounting for 10% of income (occupations are discussed shortly).  
This change in earning patterns augmented income inequality among households. 
According to the gini decomposition by source (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985; Stark et al., 
1986), the contribution of permanent wage income (with the largest source gini of .92) to 
total inequality was much higher for the young cohort than for the old (8% in cohort 1 vs. 
28% in cohort 3); qualitatively the same across-cohort comparison holds for the gini 
elasticity to permanent wage income (almost 0 in cohort 1 vs. .058 in cohort 3).
11
                                                 
10 Almost all households employ traditional farming practices, using no mechanized 
equipment or animal traction to produce taro, cassava, coconut, and kava plants; most 
households also engage in artisanal fishing, using lines and hooks, simple spear guns, or 
rudimentary nets.  
 Total 
11 This means that a 10% increase in permanent wage income augments inequality in total 
income by about .6%. The converse holds true for the across-cohort comparison of the 
gini elasticity to crop income (with the smallest source gini of .62).    13 
earned income of households with permanent employment was higher than those without; 
in particular, in cohort 3, the former was twice the latter.  
Marriage across different clans (mataqali) in the village or in other villages is 
common. In the sample, 73% of 2,334 working adults (age 20-65) – 55% of females and 
90% of males – are in their original clans (see Table 2); that is, marriage migration is 
mostly in the female domain. Among adults in both all and original clans, a small 
proportion (6-7%) have permanent employment; while the across-cohort difference in 
employment is not large, the gender gap is considerable (9% for males vs. 4% for 
females), reflecting the weak female labor market in the region.  
Occupational distribution is distinct in the gender sphere: Although about one half 
of male employments are office work/skilled labor, followed by unskilled labor, tourism 
and teaching are also important for females (office work/skilled labor count for over 60% 
of male permanent wage income). Although data about employers are lacking, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that public-sector employment is common, especially among males. 
4.2. Education 
Fiji’s current education system consists of eight-year primary (Class 1-8; Class 1 
begins at age 6) and four-year secondary (Form 3-6) (in 1997 primary education became 
compulsory).
12
                                                 
12 Following independence, the Fijian government sought to introduce a new system of 
six-year primary/four-year secondary/two-year college, but most schools did not make a 
shift to this new system, and many junior-secondary schools expanded to full secondary 
schools by adding Forms 5-6. In the paper, Forms 1 and 2 in this alternative system 
(which are uncommon in the sample) are treated as Classes 7 and 8.   
 Almost all primary and secondary schools in the country are private 
schools managed by community committees (76% primary schools and 42% secondary 
schools) and religious organizations (Ministry of Education, 2010); most schools   14 
(including those in the study area) are ethnically separated. Standardized examinations 
are held at the end of Class 8, Form 4, and Form 6 (Tavola, 1992). Successful completion 
of Form 6 is a passport to employment, tertiary education, and further training.     
Education attainments – measured by four levels (primary incomplete or below, 
primary complete, secondary incomplete, and secondary complete or above) – greatly 
improved across cohorts among working adults in all clans in the sample, as shown in 
Figure 2 (the results for those in their original clans are very similar). Although males’ 
education level was higher than that for females in cohort 1, females surpassed males in 
cohort 2, and a large gender gap in secondary-school completion emerged in cohort 3 
(under 30% for males vs. over 40% for females). Qualitatively the same pattern is 
observed across the country (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2004).  
Compared to cohort 3, secondary enrollment among youths (age 14-19) 
significantly improved: Almost 70% of those at the age of 16 are at secondary school 
with a small gender gap, as shown in Figure 3, where those at the age of 18 and 19 who 
completed secondary school are also included. At the same time, late enrollment is 
common among boys (57% of those age 15 are at secondary school), indicating 
delay/repetition in primary school. The gender gap augments at the age of 17-18 (31% for 
boys vs. 53% for girls), indicating that repetition and dropouts are more common among 
boys than girls.  
5.  Econometric specification 
5.1. Chiefly labor network   15 
I conjecture that adults’ employment is determined not only by their secondary-
school completion, but also by whether or not they belong to a chiefly labor network. I 




















K E ,           (2-1) 
where i, j, g, and v stand for individual, household, clan, and village, respectively; qi is a 
dummy for employment; hv and hg are dummies for chiefly-village and chiefly-clan status, 
respectively;
13
In equation (1-1), district dummies capture all district-level factors, including 
historical ones. Since there is only one chiefly village in each district, district dummies 
fully control for any potential chiefly-village network that can be formed within the 
chiefly village or across chiefly villages (the model cannot distinguish between these 
two). Positive Į means that access to such a village network – as a villager – contributes 
to employment. Although this does not prove the existence of a labor network, it 
indicates that if a labor network exists, it is formed according to chiefly-village status (i.e., 
a chiefly-village labor network). In equation (2-1), village dummies capture all village 
 si
a is a dummy for own highest education level a (1: primary complete, 2: 
secondary incomplete, 3: secondary complete or above); Xijgv and Xijg are vectors of other 
determinants (detailed below); D and V are district and village dummies, respectively; 
and eijgv and eijg are error terms. Equations (1-1) and (2-1) are estimated by a linear 
probability model (probit estimates are very similar to OLS results). 
                                                 
13 Chiefs/sub-chiefs are too uncommon (only 12 working adults) to estimate potential 
effects of individual/household chiefly status. The analysis focusing on commoners 
generates almost the same results as those presented below.     16 
factors and interpreting chiefly-clan network is analogous. These models do not capture 
chiefly networks formed by individuals in non-chiefly villages/clans based on their 
individual connections. Hypotheses to be tested are:  
Hypothesis 1: Adults’ employment is positively affected by their secondary-
school completion, but not lower education level; i.e., Ș
1  Ș
2 = 0, Ș
3 > 0.  
Hypothesis 2: Adults’ employment is more likely in chiefly villages and/or clans; 
i.e., Į > 0 and/or ȕ > 0. 
Three potential estimation problems need to receive special attention. First, with a 
lack of historical information regarding adults’ employment, their current employment 
status (at the time of interviews) is used as a proxy. Section 7 discusses this proxy’s 
systematic errors. Second, since information about the chiefly status of the original 
village/clan for adults not in their original clans is lacking, the analysis focuses on adults 
in their original clans; this is also true in adults’ schooling models developed shortly. If 
marriage migration is systematically correlated with chiefly status, then selection bias is a 
concern for females, but not for males, most of whom are in their original clans. Third, 
education can be correlated with unobserved factors that determine employment, such as 
ability. My focus is not to identify impacts of education on employment, but to show 
their heterogeneity across education levels (the current data lack identifying instrumental 
variables for education). I estimate the employment models with and without own 
education to see how distinct the results of the remaining variables – especially chiefly 
status – are; the same approach is taken to address the potential endogeneity of parents’ 
education in the schooling models. 
5.2. Chiefly labor networks and schooling   17 
My next conjecture is that chiefly labor networks positively affect secondary 
completion, which is instrumental for employment (hypothesis 1). As chiefly status 
captures any related factors that determine schooling, its estimated effect on schooling is 
not necessarily qualitatively the same as the network effect. In particular, even if chiefly 
labor networks positively affect schooling, chiefly status can appear to have no influence. 
Still, network effects on schooling should change in response to those on employment as 
follows. How labor networks affect schooling depends on the balance of their effects on 
employment and post-employment, the latter of which mean that labor networks benefit 
members through salary, promotion, tenure, and so forth, after they get hired.
14
Now suppose that network effects on employment decrease, because of structural 
change in the labor market, and post-employment effects do not decrease, as accumulated 
network capital sustains them. Then, net network effects on schooling unambiguously 
increase; in the extreme case where the network effect on employment vanishes, the net 
effect on schooling is unambiguously positive. I assume that the change in the effects on 
employment/schooling of chiefly labor networks is qualitatively the same as the change 
in those of chiefly status. Then, I can test the correspondence of the effects of chiefly 
status on employment and schooling.  
 On one 
hand, the post-employment effect encourages secondary-school completion among 
network members for better employment prospects; those outside the network are 
discouraged. On the other hand, the employment effect makes secondary education less 
important in the labor market, discouraging network members’ schooling. The net 
network effect on schooling is generally ambiguous.  
                                                 
14 Extending the employment models to wage to examine the post-employment effect is 
infeasible with the current data, in which employment is relatively uncommon.   18 
To capture the change in the effects of chiefly status on employment across 
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where ci
k is a dummy for cohort k (1: age 50-65, 2: age 35-49, 3: age 20-34). The 
corresponding equations for secondary schooling among working adults and youths 
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i,, respectively, are dummies for adults’ secondary-school completion, 
adults’ secondary enrollment (i.e., secondary incomplete or above), and youths’ 




ijgv are vectors of other 




ijgv are error terms. Extending equation (2-
1) and developing corresponding schooling models are analogous. All equations are 
estimated by a linear probability model.  
For the sake of clarity, I hypothesize that chiefly-village network effects on 
employment decreased in cohort 3, i.e., after the 1987 coups. In Section 7, I show that the 
decreasing network effects on employment are crucial to qualitatively identify the 
increasing effects on schooling. That is, I effectively use structural change in the labor 
market after the coups as a natural experiment.    
Hypothesis 3: If the effects of chiefly status on employment decrease across 
cohorts, those on secondary-school completion, but not enrollment, increase; i.e., 






3.     19 
If the network effects on post-employment also significantly decrease, the effects of 
chiefly status on schooling may not increase; if hypothesis 3 holds, that is not the case.     
My last conjecture is that chiefly labor networks exist among males, but not 
females. Unfortunately, female employment in the current data is too uncommon to test 
hypotheses 1-3 for females separately. Only female schooling can be separately analyzed; 
though interpreting the female results with potential selection bias requires caution.  
5.3. Covariates 
Standard covariates are used for adults’ employment: individual’s age and a 
dummy for household head; household demographics (age of household head, household 
size, proportions of children (<15) and elderly (>65)); clan size and assets (number of 
households in the clan, in the population, and total clan land, which is fixed), which can 
be correlated with chiefly-clan status; village size and market access (number of 
households in the village and time distance to the closest local market), which can be 
correlated with chiefly-village status (in models with district dummies). District dummies 
control for district-level labor-market conditions. Village/clan size captures the size of the 
potential labor network among village/clan members – either a chiefly or non-chiefly one. 
Current household assets, which are determined by the history of income and thus 
employment, are not included. Adding parents’ education as a proxy for historical 
household wealth does not alter the remaining results.  
Standard covariates are used for youths’ secondary schooling: individual’s age 
and sibling size (numbers of elder/younger sisters/brothers); mother’s/father’s education 
level, household demographics and assets (age of household head, household size, land, 
and non-land assets), which capture household permanent income; clan size and assets;   20 
and village size and school access (physical distance to primary and secondary 
schools).
15
6.  Estimation results 
 Household income is not included, because it is determined by household 
decisions on the labor supply, including youths’. Village/clan size captures potential 
externality and network effects: In the larger villages/clans, the greater number of 
children who enroll in/complete secondary school may encourage schooling among 
younger children, and parents (in remote villages) may have better networks for 
children’s co-residence with relatives out of the village. In contrast, the current data lack 
historical determinants of adults’ education attainment. I can control only for individual’s 
age, parents’ education (also partly capturing historical household wealth), clan assets 
(fixed), and proxies for historical school access (defined below). Potential omitted 
variable bias is discussed in detail in Section 7. The descriptive statistics of all covariates 
are reported in Table A1. 
Estimation results for employment, secondary-school completion, and enrollment 
(adults and youths), respectively, are reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5, where the estimated 
coefficients of chiefly status, own education, and gender are shown (results of other 
controls are discussed in appendix). Panels A1/A2 and B1/B2 in Tables 3-5, as well as 
panels C and D in Table 5, report results of the models with district dummies and those 
with village dummies, respectively;
16
                                                 
15 Access to primary school can influence delay and repetition in primary school, thereby 
affecting secondary-school enrollment. Among adults (especially old adults), access to 
primary school can also alter primary completion (it is almost uniform among youths).  
 panels A1 and B1 show results of the constrained 
models ignoring across-cohort heterogeneity in the effects of chiefly status (standard 
16 The models with village dummies can be applied only to villages with intra-village 
variations in dependent variables; otherwise, village dummies perfectly predict them.    21 
errors are clustered by village and clan, respectively), and panels A2 and B2 show those 
of the unconstrained models. In each table, columns are organized by the sample of 
interest, and the first and second columns of each set show results without and with 
own/parents’ education as controls;
17
6.1. Males 
 almost all results are qualitatively the same 
between these two, suggesting that the potential endogeneity of education is unlikely to 
cause significant bias. I discuss results for males first and then females. 
First, only secondary-school completion positively influences adults’ employment 
in a statistically significant manner (16% marginal effect); i.e., hypothesis 1 holds. This is 
so across cohorts, as shown by an extended analysis using the dummy for secondary-
school completion interacted with cohort dummies (cohorts 1 and 2 combined). Second, 
chiefly-village status, but not chiefly-clan status,
18 positively affects adults’ employment 
in cohorts 1 and 2 (8-9% marginal effect), but not in cohort 3. Ignoring across-cohort 
heterogeneity in the constrained model (1-1) fails to show that hypothesis 2 holds for 
chiefly-village status in cohorts 1 and 2 only. Third, although chiefly-village status does 
not affect adults’ secondary education – both completion and enrollment – in cohorts 1 
and 2,
19
                                                 
17 Information about parents’ education for adults is available only for parents who are in 
the same household as the one to which each adult currently belongs or for parents of 
household heads and their spouses (the survey asked separate questions about the latter 
parents). The numbers of observations for the adults’ schooling models significantly 
decrease with parents’ education added, especially for females.  
 it has strong positive influences on secondary completion in cohort 3; such 
18 Chiefly-clan status negatively influences employment in cohort 1; when a dummy for 
employment in skilled labor (excluding unskilled/other labor in Table 2) is used as a 
dependent variable, however, this effect loses statistically significance.    
19 Because adults’ secondary completion and female adults’ secondary enrolment in 
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effects are not evident in secondary enrollment in cohort 3 (the estimated effects on 
enrollment are about half of those on completion, suggesting that the former mostly 
capture the latter), as well as cohort 4 (youths). In contrast, secondary schooling for both 
adults and youths are always neutral to chiefly-clan status. Hence, the estimation results 
of employment and schooling strongly correspond to each other in terms of timing, 
education level, and group type, i.e., hypothesis 3 strongly holds.  
These results suggest the following. First, a chiefly labor network is formed 




 As it is natural that a labor network was first formed among members 
in the same chiefly clan with close kin connections, this indicates that the network 
expanded to non-chiefly clans in the chiefly village over time; the chiefly-clan network 
did not necessarily become less important. Second, the chiefly-village labor network 
drove employment, and network capital was accumulated accordingly not only in the 
colonial era, but also after independence; after the 1987 coups, this network effect on 
employment vanished. Third, schooling corresponded to this structural change in labor 
market: Those in the chiefly labor network, which sustained, augmented their education 
investment, seeking its post-employment benefits, which did not decrease much. As such, 
the chiefly-village labor network positively affected male secondary education over time.      
                                                                                                                                                 
is assumed, in equation (3-1) for both males and females and equation (3-2) for females. 
This is not a problem in testing hypothesis 3 because Į1 = Į2 is found in equation (1-2).   
20 When sub-chiefly clan status (lower status than chiefly clan) is added as an additional 
control in the models with village dummies, its estimated impacts are always 
nonsignificant in the employment and schooling models. This buttresses the significance 
of the village-level network.       23 
Although a gender gap in secondary schooling is strong among both adults 
(especially in secondary completion) and youths, gender does not differentiate 
employment, probably because male employment is also uncommon in the sample. 
Chiefly status alters female adults’ secondary schooling in qualitatively the same way as 
male adults’: Chiefly-village status has positive effects on secondary completion in 
cohort 3 only (the estimated marginal effects are smaller than those for males, and 
accordingly those for all adults are in between males and females). Available evidence 
for a chiefly labor network for females is weak: 1) female employment is very 
uncommon across cohorts, especially in cohort 3 (only 2%, Table 2); 2) the estimated 
coefficients of chiefly-village status on employment for all adults in cohorts 1 and 2 are 
smaller and less statistically significant (in cohort 1) than those for males; and 3) the 
marginal effects for all adults decrease across cohorts in a much less sharp manner than 
those for males.
21
Why does it appear that females in chiefly villages started to complete secondary 
school more commonly than those in other villages? Does this reflect only a recent 
change in distinct patterns of their marriage migration between chiefly and non-chiefly 
villages (i.e., selection bias)? Did females start to seek post-employment benefits of a 
chiefly labor network, as males did, for example? More research is needed in other 
locales where female employment is common (e.g., urban areas and tourism) by 
combining complete information of adults’ original clans.  
  
7.  Robustness 
                                                 
21 It is possible that some adults (especially females) not in their original clans got their 
current employment after they moved to the current village. I estimate the employment 
equations for all adults (and males) including those not in their original clans, finding 
similar results. This serves as some counterevidence against potential selection bias.   24 
7.1. Systematic measurement errors in employment status 
The estimated positive effects of chiefly status on current employment are those 
not on employment per se, but on the combination of historical employment and tenure. 
The estimated employment effects of chiefly-village status in cohorts 1 and 2 can be 
biased upward; in contrast, its nonsignificant effects in cohort 3, as well as those of 
chiefly-clan status across cohorts, are robust to such potential bias (such bias is minor for 
young adults anyway). This means that the network effects on employment did not 
actually decrease across cohorts, only if the estimated positive effects of chiefly-village 
status capture post-employment effects only. This should be very unlikely. Also, although 
such an upward bias is expected to be greater in cohort 1 than cohort 2, the estimated 
marginal effects of chiefly-village status are almost the same in between them. Therefore, 
the decreasing effects of chiefly-village status on employment are qualitatively robust. 
7.2. Omitted variable bias in schooling models 
Chiefly-village/-clan status might be correlated with unobserved factors that 
determine schooling. This is especially a concern in the adults’ schooling models with 
very limited controls. As discussed shortly, although historical school access, school 
quality, and historical household wealth are potential sources of upward bias in the 
estimated impacts of chiefly status on schooling, such bias could be significant mainly in 
cohorts 1 and 2, not cohort 3. Then, if chiefly status picks up such unobserved effects, it 
causes a decrease in the estimated effects across cohorts. Hence, the increasing effects on 
secondary-school completion – in correspondence to the decreasing effects on 
employment (hypothesis 3) – are qualitatively robust to such omitted variable bias.   25 
Qualitative gender comparison in the schooling models is robust to any potential bias 
caused by unobserved village and clan factors. 
Historical school access 
Distinct from the models with village dummies that fully control for historical 
school conditions, school construction, especially the expansion of secondary schools 
after independence (at the time of cohort 2’s schooling), could be positively correlated 
with chiefly-village status in the models with district dummies (equations 3-1 and 3-2). 
This is because under the grant-in-aid system, the government might treat community 
committees associated with chiefly villages with stronger political connections better than 
other villages (Banerjee et al., 2009 review empirical research on collective action and 
public goods; e.g., Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007). As only one Fijian secondary school 
is available in each district, if any, district dummies control for historical availability of a 
secondary school in the district; though information of historical school access within the 
district is lacking. I use distance to current schools – primary and secondary – interacted 
with cohort dummies as proxies for historical school access. Results of the remaining 
variables are very similar to each other, both with and without the proxies. It is noted that 
not only are models with school access omitted, but also models with these proxies could 
involve upward bias in the estimated impacts of chiefly-village status, because errors in 
the proxies are smaller in magnitude in chiefly villages than in other villages (if the 
former’s access improved faster); though the appendix offers counterevidence against 
such systematic errors. Measurement errors in the proxies must be much larger for 
secondary school than primary school with a much longer history; the older the cohorts, 
the greater are the measurement errors, of course.    26 
School quality 
School quality also could be positively correlated with chiefly-village status. 
Although the current data lack information about school quality, district dummies fully 
control for the current and historical quality of secondary schools (including boarding 
facilities). At the same time, however, district dummies partially control for the quality of 
primary schools, because some districts have/had more than one primary school. If the 
quality of primary schools uncontrolled by district dummies influences secondary 
schooling through primary-school completion and academic performance, it could cause 
upward bias in the estimated impacts of chiefly-village status on secondary schooling for 
both adults and youths. This potential bias is likely to be the largest among older adults in 
cohort 1, many of whom did not complete primary education.
22
Historical household wealth 
  
In the adults’ schooling models, unobserved historical household wealth not 
captured by parents’ education and clan assets might be positively correlated with 
chiefly-village/-clan status; then, if household wealth positively affects schooling, the 
estimated impacts of chiefly status are biased upward. As parents’ education became a 
more important determinant of income over time (Hypothesis 1 and Table 1), unobserved 
welfare effects, if any, should be greater among older adults in cohort 1 than among 
younger adults. Indeed, estimated welfare effects are not so strong among youths, 
especially boys, as reported in the appendix.  
Historical village and clan size 
                                                 
22 If the recent quality improvement of primary schools is systematically differentiated by 
chiefly-village status, the potential bias through distinct academic performance could be 
considerable in cohorts 3 and 4.    27 
In the adults’ schooling models, unobserved historical village/clan size positively 
correlated with chiefly village/clan status could cause upward bias, because of the 
externality/network effects discussed above. In particular, if chiefly villages recently 
augmented in size more rapidly than other villages, and both chiefly and non-chiefly 
clans in the chiefly village augmented in the same way, this could lead to an increase in 
secondary schooling in chiefly villages, but not in chiefly clans; that is, chiefly-village 
status could pick up network effects not related to a chiefly network. This potential bias is 
unlikely to be a concern for the following reasons. First, such demographic patterns are 
unlikely to be caused by female marriage migration, because there is no significant 
difference in chiefly-village/-clan status of females in their original clans and others 
across cohorts. Second, urban migration could be more common in chiefly villages/clans 
than others, if chiefly network drives urban employment and tertiary education. Third, 
explaining why externality/network effects matter for secondary completion, but not 
enrollment is not straightforward; the appendix offers counterevidence among youths.
23
8.  Conclusion 
  
Using original household survey data in rural Fiji, which contain unique 
information about chiefly-group status, and Fijian coups as a natural experiment, this 
paper showed evidence that chiefly labor networks in non-farm occupations that 
originated from the British colonial policy has persistently affected Fijians’ schooling. 
Most male Fijians outside the chiefly network have been discouraged from making 
education investments over time. As non-farm employment plays an increasing role in 
                                                 
23 I also repeated the analysis using current village size interacted with cohort dummies as 
proxies for historical size, finding very similar results for chiefly status; these proxies 
could contain systematic errors which are generally unsigned (cf. historical school 
access).   28 
earnings, income inequality has augmented among Fijians. Without being directly 
constrained by this chiefly institution, Indians and Female Fijians outperformed male 
Fijians in higher education. As such, an indigenous chiefly system shaped the country’s 
economic growth and inequality through institutional developments in its colonial history.    
Appendix 
This appendix discusses estimation results of other covariates (results not shown, 
unless otherwise noted). First, significant results in the adults’ employment models are 
limited to positive and negative effects of household-head status and distance to local 
market (the latter indicates major employment opportunities in towns).  
Second, the estimated coefficients of parents’ education in the schooling models 
for adults and youths are reported in Table A2 (for adults, parents’ secondary incomplete 
and complete or above are combined to secondary incomplete or above, because 
secondary completion is uncommon among them). Reflecting the rapid progress of 
female schooling, the higher the education level, the more important is mother’s 
secondary education compared to father’s. Specifically, although only father’s secondary 
education positively affects both male and female adults’ primary-school completion or 
above (results not shown), father’s and mother’s secondary education, respectively, 
influence male and female adults’ secondary enrollment, and only mother’s matters for 
both adults’ secondary completion, with greater effects on females than males. In contrast, 
mother’s secondary completion matters for boys’ secondary enrollment, but not girls’.   
Third, consistent with general education development, secondary schooling – both 
completion and enrollment – is more common among younger adults (both males and 
females). Distance to secondary school (proxies) negatively affects secondary-school   29 
enrollment, but not completion, among female adults, but not male, in cohorts 1 and 2, 
but not cohort 3. Hence, secondary enrollment was constrained by school access, and 
rural-school expansion after independence significantly helped female schooling. This 
does not mean that school access did not matter for young adults, rather, that their school 
access affecting enrollment is captured by district dummies (for secondary completion 
this is the case over time). This also serves as counterevidence against significant 
systematic errors in the proxies for historical school access.  
Fourth, the following results are found for youths’ secondary schooling. While 
girls’ schooling is constrained by non-land assets (positive impacts), but not land, 
secondary schooling is strived for by boys with a smaller prospect for land accumulation 
(total clan land, not household assets, has negative effects). Girls with a greater number 
of younger sisters are less likely to enroll (presumably to help care them), and boys in 
larger clans are more likely to enroll (consistent with the externality/network effects). As 
found among young adults, access to secondary school not captured by district dummies 
is not a constraint. At the same time, girls’ secondary schooling is negatively affected by 
distance to primary school (similar patterns are found for male adults’ secondary 
enrollment). This is probably because school access (within the district) affects 
delay/repetition in primary school.   
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A. Employment and income.
All
Cohort 1: 






0.16 0.13 0.17 0.22
Total earned income per capita (F$)
2281 2337 2083 2727
(2647) (2951) (2110) (2825)
2113 2178 1991 2235
(2575) (2952) (2123) (1981)
3168 3359 2521 4408
(2847) (2758) (2006) (4339)
No. observations 903 455 349 99











Crop 0.62 0.62 0.91 0.67 0.047
Fishing 0.11 0.72 0.66 0.10 -0.011
Handicraft 0.08 0.70 0.42 0.05 -0.037
Permanent wage labor 0.10 0.92 0.60 0.11 0.004
Other 0.08 0.81 0.62 0.08 -0.004
Total 0.53
Cohort 1:
Crop 0.63 0.66 0.94 0.69 0.055
Fishing 0.11 0.74 0.69 0.10 -0.010
Handicraft 0.10 0.71 0.47 0.06 -0.041
Permanent wage labor 0.08 0.93 0.62 0.08 0.001
Other 0.09 0.84 0.63 0.08 -0.005
Total 0.57
Cohort 2:
Crop 0.63 0.58 0.90 0.68 0.051
Fishing 0.11 0.69 0.61 0.10 -0.014
Handicraft 0.07 0.66 0.40 0.04 -0.032
Permanent wage labor 0.10 0.90 0.50 0.09 -0.006
Other 0.09 0.77 0.63 0.09 0.000
Total 0.48
Cohort 3:
Crop 0.54 0.58 0.79 0.53 -0.006
Fishing 0.12 0.71 0.64 0.12 -0.004
Handicraft 0.05 0.71 0.26 0.02 -0.033
Permanent wage labor 0.22 0.88 0.67 0.28 0.058
Other 0.06 0.72 0.47 0.05 -0.017
Total 0.47
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 1. Employment, income, and inequality decomposition by income 
source by cohort.
Age of household head
With permanent wage 
labor employment
Without permanent wage 
labor employment
All
Permanent wage labor 
employment (0/1)  35 
 
   
Table 2. Employment and education attainment of working adults.
All Male Female
Employment
Permanent wage labor (0/1) 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.04
Cohort 1: age 50-65 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04
Cohort 2: age 35-49 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.04
Cohort 3: age 20-34 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.02
Occupational distribution (unweighted)
Office work/skilled labor 41% 42% 47% 25%
Tourism 9% 11% 7% 25%
Teacher 13% 9% 5% 25%
Military 3% 3% 3% 0%
Unskilled labor 26% 30% 32% 21%
Other 8% 5% 5% 4%
Occupational distribution (weighted by earnings)
Office work/skilled labor 50% 55% 61% 28%
Tourism 7% 8% 6% 18%
Teacher 15% 9% 6% 28%
Military 3% 3% 3% 0%
Unskilled labor 17% 19% 19% 21%
Other 8% 6% 6% 5%
Education attainment
Primary incomplete or below (0/1) 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17
Primary complete (0/1) 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.26
Secondary incomplete (0/1) 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.31
Secondary complete or above (0/1) 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.26
No. observations 2334 1712 1093 619
Cohort 1: age 50-65 23% 22% 23% 22%
Cohort 2: age 35-49 36% 34% 37% 30%
Cohort 3: age 20-34 41% 43% 41% 48%
All 
clans
Original clans  36 
   
Table 3. Permanent employment of working adults in original clans.
Education No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A1. Models with district dummies - chiefly-village status.
0.042 0.038 0.060 0.052
(0.026) (0.027) (0.037) (0.038)
0.109 0.120 0.103 0.116
1617 1591 1019 1009
A2. Models with district dummies - chiefly-village status by cohort.
0.042 0.040 0.087 ** 0.080 *
(0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.042)
0.065 ** 0.065 ** 0.091 *** 0.088 **
(0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.035)
0.023 0.015 0.012 0.001
(0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029)
B1. Models with village dummies - chiefly-clan status.
-0.021 -0.017 -0.068 -0.071







0.123 *** 0.159 ***
(0.034) (0.047)
0.149 0.166 0.161 0.182
1071 1049 699 689
B2. Models with village dummies - chiefly-clan status by cohort.
-0.127 ** -0.127 ** -0.149 ** -0.159 **
(0.052) (0.053) (0.075) (0.077)
0.087 0.092 0.028 0.032
(0.077) (0.075) (0.096) (0.095)
-0.035 -0.030 -0.091 -0.098






Chiefly village × cohort 1
Chiefly village × cohort 2




*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. 
Note: OLS estimates are shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Standard errors in panels A1 and B1 are clustered by village and clan, 
respectively. Other controls not shown here are age, household head dummy, age 
of household head, household size, proportion of children (<15), proportion of 
elderly (>65), total clan land (log), clan size (log), distance to local market (log), 
village size (log), and constant. Female dummy is also included in columns (1) 
and (2) of panels A1, A2, and B2 and education variables are also included in 
columns (2) and (4) of panels A1, A2, and B2. 




Chiefly clan × cohort 1
Chiefly clan × cohort 2
Chiefly clan × cohort 3  37 
Table 4. Secondary-school completion of working adults in original clans.
Parents' education No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A1. Models with district dummies - chiefly-village status.
0.052 ** 0.086 *** 0.064 *** 0.094 *** 0.030 0.059
(0.021) (0.028) (0.019) (0.027) (0.035) (0.047)
0.194 0.194 0.076 0.122 0.206 0.313
1596 972 1012 648 584 319
A2. Models with district dummies - chiefly-village status by cohort.
-0.018 -0.004 -0.010 0.003 -0.039 -0.044
(0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.036) (0.038) (0.058)
0.147 *** 0.205 *** 0.180 *** 0.239 *** 0.108 * 0.155 **
(0.038) (0.048) (0.049) (0.062) (0.063) (0.075)
B1. Models with village dummies - chiefly-clan status.
-0.002 -0.036 0.023 0.005 -0.021 -0.092
(0.043) (0.050) (0.048) (0.064) (0.064) (0.072)
0.076 *** 0.088 ***
(0.021) (0.029)
0.130 0.189 0.086 0.129 0.240 0.363
1485 932 939 590 516 300
B2. Models with village dummies - chiefly-clan status by cohort.
-0.032 -0.057 -0.030 -0.035 0.003 -0.030
(0.046) (0.053) (0.056) (0.066) (0.074) (0.092)
0.038 -0.007 0.100 0.060 -0.052 -0.167





Chiefly clan × cohorts 1&2
Chiefly clan × cohort 3
*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. 
Note: OLS estimates are shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors in panels 
A1 and B1 are clustered by village and clan, respectively. Other controls not shown here are age, total 
clan land (log), and constant. Distance to primary and secondary schools (interacted with cohort 
dummies) (log) are also included in panel A1 and A2. Female dummy is also included in columns (1) 
and (2) of panels A1, A2, and B2 and parents' education variables are also included in columns (2), (4), 
and (6) of all panels.  
Chiefly village × cohorts 1&2




No. observations  38 
Parents' education No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A1. Adults' models with district dummies - chiefly-village status.
0.047 * 0.062 * 0.052 * 0.051 0.038 0.103 *
(0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.051)
0.194 0.194 0.170 0.189 0.250 0.237
1596 972 1012 648 584 319
A2. Adults' models with district dummies - chiefly-village status by cohort.
-0.034 0.001 0.009 0.036
(0.045) (0.064) (0.058) (0.075)
0.065 * 0.065 0.016 0.017 0.067 0.120
(0.039) (0.053) (0.050) (0.066) (0.052) (0.078)
0.075 ** 0.091 ** 0.110 ** 0.093 0.007 0.087
(0.036) (0.044) (0.047) (0.057) (0.055) (0.071)
B1. Adults' models with village dummies - chiefly-clan status.
0.024 0.014 0.066 0.082 -0.035 -0.135 *
(0.050) (0.046) -0.050 -0.055 (0.079) -0.080
0.055 ** 0.048
(0.022) (0.030)
0.193 0.203 0.164 0.191 0.275 0.284
1485 947 966 638 512 295
B2. Adults' models with village dummies - chiefly-clan status by cohort.
-0.059 -0.047 -0.006 0.042
(0.077) (0.092) (0.103) (0.116)
0.103 0.075 0.079 0.067 0.037 -0.057
(0.071) (0.094) (0.090) (0.121) (0.093) (0.128)
0.019 0.015 0.104 0.120 -0.126 -0.230 *
(0.059) (0.072) (0.071) (0.084) (0.104) (0.135)
C. Youths' models with district dummies - chiefly-village status.
0.023 0.066 0.029 0.085 0.031 0.064
(0.049) (0.057) (0.080) (0.114) (0.068) (0.075)
0.120 0.120 0.111 0.113 0.187 0.226
506 389 258 201 226 171
D. Youths' models with village dummies - chiefly-clan status.
0.042 0.005 0.123 0.066 -0.086 -0.132
(0.120) (0.143) (0.125) (0.182) (0.183) (0.225)
0.119 ** 0.122 **
(0.048) (0.057)
0.181 0.187 0.233 0.275 0.237 0.249
480 365 235 173 194 132
No. observations
No. observations
*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. 
a Cohorts 1 and 2 combined in columns (5) and (6).
Note: OLS estimates are shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors in panels 
A1/C and B1/D are clustered by village and clan, respectively. Other controls in panels A1, A2, B1, and 
B2 not shown here are age, total clan land (log), and constant. Distance to primary and secondary 
schools (interacted with cohort dummies) (log) are also included in panel A1 and A2 and female dummy 
is also included in columns (1) and (2) of panels A1, A2, and B2. Other controls in panels C and D not 
shown here are age, no. of elder sisters, younger sisters, elder brothers, and younger sisters, age of 
household head, household size, land (m
2, log), non-land assets (log), total clan land (acre, log), clan 
size (log), and constant. Distance to primary and secondary schools (log) and village size (log) are also 
included in panel C and girl dummy is also included in columns (1) and (2) of panel C.  Parents' education 
variables are also included in columns (2), (4), and (6) of all panels. 
No. observations
Chiefly clan × cohort 1
Chiefly clan × cohort 2
a
Chiefly clan × cohort 3
Chiefly village (0/1)
R-squared





Chiefly village × cohort 1
Chiefly village × cohort 2
a






R-squared  39 




(Village 1) (Village 2)
Yavusa 1 Yavusa 2
Mataqali 1 Mataqali 2
Tokatoka 1 Tokatoka 2
Household 1 Household 2
Note: Chiefly village and chiefly clan (mataqali) are bolded.  40 























Age 50-65 35-49 20-34 50-65 35-49 20-34
primary incomplete or below primary complete
secondary incomplete secondary complete or above  41 
























All Male Female  42 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables.
A. Households. B. Working adults (age 20-65) and youths (age 14-19).
All Male Female
Chiefly status Female (0/1) 0.48 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.46
Chiefly village (0/1) 0.34 Age 38.8 38.3 38.9 37.3 16.4
Chiefly clan (0/1) 0.14 (12.8) (13.0) (12.7) (13.5) (1.7)
Household characteristics Household head (0/1) 0.31 0.39 0.57 0.07
Age of household head 51.4 (14.6) No. of elder brothers 0.25 (0.51)
Household size 5.5 (2.7) No. of younger brothers 1.23 (1.26)
Proportion of children (<15) 0.32 (0.24) No. of elder sisters 0.37 (0.67)
Proportion of elderly (>65) 0.09 (0.21) No. of younger sisters 1.51 (1.37)
Land (acre) 2.9 (4.8) No. observations 2334 1712 1093 619 545
Non-land assets (F$) 1844 (4455) Mother's education
Clan characteristics Primary incomplete or below (0/1) 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.58 0.17
No. households in the clan 21.0 (14.3) Primary complete (0/1) 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.36
Village characteristics Secondary incomplete (0/1) 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.41
No. households in the village 53.3 (21.3) Secondary complete or above (0/1) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06
Distance to primary school (km) 1.5 (2.8) Father's education
Distance to secondary school (km) 19.2 (28.2) Primary incomplete or below (0/1) 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.19
Distance to local market (min) 81.4 (68.7) Primary complete (0/1) 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.40
Secondary incomplete (0/1) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.31
Secondary complete or above (0/1) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10
No. observations 903 No. observations 1543 1146 763 383 430




Adults in original clans








A. Adults' secondary-school completion













0.027 -0.015 0.153 *
(0.055) (0.073) (0.088)
0.123 ** 0.149 ** 0.062
(0.060) (0.065) (0.110)













Father's secondary incomplete or above (0/1)
Table A2. Effects of parents' education on schooling of working adults in original 
clans and youths unreported in Tables 4 and 5.
Mother's primary complete (0/1)
Father's primary complete (0/1)
Mother's secondary incomplete or above (0/1)
Father's secondary incomplete or above (0/1)
Mother's primary complete (0/1)
Father's primary complete (0/1)
Mother's secondary incomplete or above (0/1)
*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. 
Note: Columns (1)-(3) of panels A, B, and C, respectively, match columns (2), (4), and (6) 
in panel B1 of Table 4, panel B1 of Table 5, and panel D of Table 5.
Mother's primary complete (0/1)
Father's primary complete (0/1)
Mother's secondary incomplete (0/1)
Father's secondary incomplete (0/1)
Mother's secondary complete or above (0/1)
Father's secondary complete or above (0/1)